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Independent central banks are thought to be effective inflation hawks because they
are run by technocrats with conservative monetary policy preferences. However,
central bankers can only protect their independence by compromising with the
elected officials who grant them their independence. Policy, therefore, is likely to be
a weighted average of the preferences of the central bank and the government. Con-
sequently, central bankers may be eager to help right-wing governments stay in
power and oppose the election of left-wing governments. We show evidence from
the United States that interest rates (a) decline as elections approach when Republi-
cans control the White House, but rise when Democrats do; and (b) are sensitive to
the inflation rate (output gap) when Democrats (Republicans) are in the White
House. Thus, the Federal Reserve is a conditional inflation hawk. Since the Fed
became operationally independent in 1951, the Republicans have exhibited a
decided electoral advantage in presidential politics.
The Federal Reserve System of the United States has long been considered one of the
most independent central banks in the world. Independent central banks are thought
to be effective inflation hawks because they are run by technocrats with more conser-
vative monetary policy preferences than the median voter (Rogoff, 1985). In this arti-
cle, we argue that if central bankers derive inflation fighting powers from strongly
held, extreme preferences, then these preferences over policy may translate into prefer-
ences over who governs. Specifically, if the Fed has preferences to the right of Repub-
licans, and if monetary policy is driven in part by the preferences of the President,
then the Fed should prefer to see Republican presidents get elected. We analyze data
on over half a century of monetary policy in the United States, and find that the Fed
acts in ways that promote the (re)election of Republican presidential candidates. The
Fed’s main policy tool, the Federal Funds Rate (FFR), declines as elections approach
when Republicans control the White House, but rises before elections when the sitting
President is a Democrat. In addition, we find that the FFR responds to the inflation
rate only when Democrats are in the White House, but responds to the size of the
output gap in preelectoral periods only when the Republicans are in the White House.
In summary, the Federal Reserve is a conditional inflation hawk–it cares about infla-
tion, but only when the President is a Democrat.
In a recent book, Bartels (2010) points to the “Republicans’ surprising success in
concentrating income growth in election years” which, in turn, helps explain why
“Republican presidential candidates have fared so well over the past-half century.”
Our findings suggest that there are systematic differences in Fed behavior under
Republican and Democratic presidents since the Fed became operationally indepen-
dent in the middle of the twentieth century. These differences are most acute in pre-
electoral periods and, so, could plausibly affect electoral outcomes. Consequently, if
*Corresponding author: William Roberts, University of Michigan, 505 S State Street, 5700 Haven Hall,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045, USA. E-mail: wrclark@umich.edu
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 1
ECONOMICS & POLITICS DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12006
Volume 25 March 2013 No. 1
the Fed is independent, but not indifferent, it could explain the Republican’s success
in concentrating income growth in election years.
Our argument introduces a small but consequential change in the traditional
approach to the politics of monetary policy. Positive political economy models have
typically replaced benevolent social planners with survival or vote-maximizing politi-
cians. These politicians may have policy goals, but they must weigh these goals against
the fact that retaining office is often a necessary condition for them to even achieve
their objectives.
However, the positive political economy of monetary policy represents a partial
exception to this trend. Analyses of the time inconsistency problem in monetary pol-
icy, for example, retain benevolent social planners to demonstrate the robustness of
the problem: discretionary policy leads to higher than optimal inflation rates even if
we are fortunate enough to have an economy run by benevolent social planners (Barro
and Gordon, 1983; Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Elected politicians are thought to be
particularly sensitive to the political pressures that ensue when output falls below the
natural rate. They are, therefore, keen to trade increased inflation for output gains.
This generates a time inconsistency problem – if politicians could commit to a low
inflation rule, they would be able to produce an outcome closer to the social optimum,
but short-term political pressures, perhaps induced by the electoral calendar, make
such commitments incredible.
One solution (Rogoff, 1985) is to appoint a central banker whose preferences over
inflation are sufficiently hawkish to produce, somewhat unwittingly, a socially desir-
able outcome despite falling victim to the time inconsistency problem. Another
(Walsh, 1995) is to write a contract between the political principal and the central
banker that ties the banker’s compensation to its ability to meet predetermined policy
goals. In the Rogoff model, elected officials who delegate to a conservative central
bankers are essentially strategic benevolent social planners. Like Odysseus, they tie
themselves to the mast and resign their fates to slaves with wax in their ears to accom-
plish what they could not achieve on their own – the optimization of a social welfare
function. In the Walsh model, elected politicians sign a contract with the central
banker that threatens to punish the banker if he fails to implement the socially opti-
mal low inflation policy. Curiously, while the politician cannot behave as a benevolent
social planner because of the time inconsistency problem, it is assumed that he will
punish any central banker who fails to do so.
Canonical models of central bank independence, then, take one step forward and
one step back. They treat politicians as electorally minded strategic actors capable of
designing institutions that trick central bankers into producing policies preferred by
the median voter. However, they assume that central bankers are apartisan techno-
crats who optimize within the constraints created by their political principals without
considering how the choices they make today can shape the political environment
tomorrow.
In this article, we consider what happens when the positive political economy
approach is applied more fully to the political economy of central bank independence.
What if both the elected principal and the central banker act like fully strategic actors?
Our answer is that strategic, conservative central bankers should behave as conditional
inflation hawks because doing so can result in the (re)election of political principals
that more closely share their policy preferences. The idea that independent central
bankers would intervene in such a partisan fashion is largely absent from the
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literature. Two important exceptions that presaged our argument are Cusack (2001)
and Galbraith et al. (2007).
We analyze data on half a century of Fed policy to evaluate our argument. We find
that the Fed raises interest rates as elections approach when Democrats control the
White House, but lowers interest rates as elections approach under Republican admin-
istrations. Furthermore, when Democrats control the White House, the Fed increases
interest rates in response to increased inflationary expectations, especially as elections
approach, but it is insensitive to the gap between actual and potential output. The
pattern is reversed under Republicans: the Fed lowers interest rates in response to
declining growth – especially as elections approach – but is insensitive to inflationary
expectations. These results are consistent with the idea that the Fed prefers Republi-
can presidents, and that it acts to help ensure their election and reelection. Evidence
presented below suggests that the political independence of the Fed allows it to act
effectively in light of its political preferences: Republicans were much more effective in
gaining and keeping the White House in the half-century after the Fed became opera-
tionally independent than in the period preceding operational independence.
In the next section, we explain why the Fed prefers that the White House be con-
trolled by Republicans, and we discuss why this should lead it to act like a conditional
inflation hawk. In section 2, we present evidence that the FFR is tied to the electoral
calendar and that this link is different when Republicans control the White House
than when Democrats do. We also present evidence that the Fed’s reaction to inflation
and the output gap depends on both the election calendar and the partisan orientation
of the White House. We also explore the robustness of these results and compare
them to the expectations of two rival approaches to the partisan control of monetary
policy – the “rational partisan model” of Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), and the
notion that monetary policy is driven the partisan orientation of the president that
first appointed the sitting Fed chairman (Abrams and Iossifov, 2006). Section 3 sum-
marizes our results and describes changes in the presidential electoral fortunes of the
two parties during the (near) century since the creation of the Fed.
1. THEORY: WHY WE EXPECT THE FED TO BE A CONDITIONAL INFLATION HAWK
We argue that the Fed manipulates monetary policy in a partisan fashion. In this sec-
tion, we articulate two steps of our argument. First, we explain why the Fed cares
which party rules. Second, we show why this leads the Fed to respond to electoral
and macroeconomic pressures in a manner that is conditioned by the party of the
president.
1.1 If Parties have Monetary Preferences, Conservative Central Bankers have Partisan
Preferences
The standard partisan model of monetary policy assumes that political parties repre-
sent constituencies with distinct preferences over inflation and unemployment (Hibbs
1977). One way to think of this is that net debtors are less concerned with inflation
than net creditors and, so, place greater weight on achieving their output goals than
their inflation goal. Even if both actors had the same output goal, the amount of infla-
tion they would be willing to tolerate to accomplish that goal would differ. For exam-
ple, imagine citizen i’s policy preferences were given by the loss function:
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Li ¼ aðp pÞ2 þ ð1 aÞðy yÞ2; ð1Þ
where y is output, y is i’s output target (perhaps potential GDP), p is inflation and
p is i’s inflation target. Assume, without loss of generality, that all citizens in society
share target rates for output and inflation (perhaps potential GDP and zero inflation).
Individuals would still differ in their assessment of outcomes if they placed different
weights on hitting these targets. Holding inflation constant, actors can be arrayed along
a unit interval from a = 0 (output junkies) to a = 1 (inflation hawks). The partisan
model of monetary policy assumes that left-wing parties represent the interests of voters
with lower incomes who care more about output than inflation, placing them on the
lower end of this unit interval. Right-wing parties are thought to represent high income
individuals who care more about inflation than output, placing them on the upper end
of this unit interval. The desire to represent the interests of voters in their constituencies
induces ideal points for left and right-wing parties as pictured in Figure 1.
The Rogoff model of central bank independence maintains that the time inconsis-
tency problem in monetary policy can be mitigated if politicians delegate policy to a
central banker who is even more inflation averse than right-wing politicians. Thus, if
central bank independence works the way Rogoff suggests, independent central bank-
ers will have alpha’s that place them to the right of right-wing parties as in Figure 1.
There are reasons to believe, however, that even independent central bankers will
not be able to implement their ideal point. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue that
executive agencies granted with autonomy need to be mindful of the fact that the leg-
islature that grants that independence can also take it away. Berger and Schneider
(2000) show that the Bundesbank’s policies moved in parallel with changes in the com-
position of the Bundestag. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) argue that a change in the
composition of government is likely to lead to a change in the reversion point – the
policy that the government would implement in the absence of independence. A
rational central banker will seek to deter the government’s abrogation of the agree-
ment that led to his or her independence. Therefore, the banker should adopt a policy
that is as close to its ideal point as possible, subject to the constraint that the political
coalition needed to abrogate independence needs to be at least indifferent between the
policy adopted by an independent central bank and the policy that would prevail in
the absence of independence. The exact position adopted by an independent central
banker will, therefore, be influenced by the political institutions that dictate what is
necessary to change the status quo – including executive-legislative relations, the pres-
ence of a second house, super majority requirements, and whether the government is a
coalition or single party government. However, in general, if the central banker’s ideal
point is to the right of the right-most party, the best it can do in the short run is move
to the left when the left-wing party comes to power and to the right when a right-wing
party comes to power. At the very least, we can expect policy to be somewhere in the
interval between R and CB when there is a right-wing government in power and L
and CB when there is a left-wing government in power (see Figure 1). If central banks
L R CB
0 1
Figure 1. Spatial relationship between central bankers and parties.
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are (at most) partially independent, then we can think of equilibrium policy as being
some convex combination (determined by the degree of independence) of the ideal
points of the government and the central bank (Franzese, 1999). For all the reasons
just stated, it is difficult to predict exactly where the optimal short run policy is for
the central banker. Nevertheless, we can expect policy to be somewhere between the
government’s ideal point and the bank’s ideal point and this location should be closer
to the central bank’s ideal point when right-wing governments are in power.
1.2 Central Bankers with Partisan Preferences have Incentives to Influence Elections
So far, our discussion suggests that we ought to observe fluctuations in interest rates
in the United States which are consistent with the traditional partisan model. The Fed
should guard its independence by accommodating left-wing policies as the political
center of gravity moves to the left, and it is free to adopt a policy closer to its ideal
point as the center of gravity moves to the right. An alternative model, the political
business cycle model, presumes that politicians are responding to an electorate that
votes in a rationally retrospective fashion – they vote for incumbents when economic
growth in the preelectoral period exceeds some critical level, but vote for the chal-
lenger otherwise (Lohmann, 2003). Clark and Hallerberg (2000) and Alpanda and Ho-
nig (2009) argue that central bank independence ought to inhibit politicians’ ability to
engage in this sort of opportunistic behavior, though Alpanda and Honig (2009) find
more evidence for this constraining effect of central bank independence in developing
countries than in developed countries.
However, if central bankers believe voters will reward preelectoral expansions, they
may have incentives both to help right-wing parties engage in such expansions and to
frustrate attempts by left-wing parties to do so. In effect, central bankers in such a
world face an intertemporal tradeoff when right-wing governments are in power. They
can push for the policy closest to their ideal point knowing that doing so hinders the
right-wing party’s prospects of reelection, or they can accept a more expansionary pol-
icy now in exchange for an increase in the probability that the government in power
during nonelectoral times will be closer to its ideal point.1 In contrast, when left-wing
parties are in power, a conservative central banker faces no such dilemma. Political
preferences align with the Fed’s well publicized commitment to price stability, since
the political consequence of following through on that commitment is an increase in
the probability that a government with an ideal point closer to its own will get elected.
Thus, we can expect independent central banks to act like conservative independent
central banks – but only when left-wing governments are in power. When the party
the central bank favors is in power, the central bank should be more willing to accom-
modate preelectoral expansions: that is, it should act in the fashion traditionally asso-
ciated with dependent central banks. This conditional accommodation is not evidence
of a lack of independence. Far from it. It is evidence that the bank is using its inde-
pendence to act on the fact that it is not indifferent.
1Another interpretation of the situation is that right-wing parties become “as if” they were a left-wing
party as elections approach and central banks are merely responding to a new “reversion” point – the point
that the right-wing government is implicitly threatening to implement if the central bank does not accommo-
date their temporarily expansionary wishes. However, if this was what was going on, the central bank
should also behave in a more expansionary manner when elections draw near when left-wing parties control
the government.
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1.3 Possible Objections
So far, we have assumed that independent central bankers have conservative prefer-
ences over monetary policy, but we have not explained why they would hold such pref-
erences. We can invoke three reasons to justify this assumption. First, according to the
logic of the Rogoff model, central bank independence is created to overcome the time
inconsistency problem that plagues monetary policy. If those who grant independence
to the bank do so for this reason, it would not make sense to appoint anyone other
than an inflation hawk. Some might find it anachronistic to attribute this chain of rea-
soning to political principals operating decades before Kydland and Prescott, Barro
and Gordon, and Rogoff, but there are other reasons why central bankers might be
conservative. Monetary policy is a technical endeavor and exercising effective leader-
ship of a central bank without a solid command of the economics of financial markets
is highly unlikely. Thus, central bankers are likely to be drawn from an epistemic com-
munity with close ties to financial firms. In other words, central banks are prone to
“industry capture.” If one accepts the Posen (1995) argument that members of the
financial community have reasons to have antiinflationary preferences, the selection
process of central bankers makes it likely that they will be “conservative” in the Rogof-
fian sense. Finally, while Adolph (2004) is careful to point out that “independent” need
not mean “conservative” he argues that central bankers may adopt ideological posi-
tions that will be favored by future employers. If the future employment possibilities
for central bankers come overwhelmingly from financial firms, Adolph (combined with
the Posen thesis) provides a forward-looking rationale for central bank conservatism.
Another possible objection is that while “left” and “right” wing may be appropriate
labels for comparing socialist and business-oriented parties in western Europe, when
viewed in a comparative context, Republicans and Democrats are best thought of as
relatively similar “center-right” parties. This may be true, but all that is necessary for
our model is that the parties differ in their propensity to represent antiinflationary
constituencies. Our expectations are driven by the ordinal ranking of expected policies
in the mind of the central bank, not the magnitude of the difference.
Yet, another concern may be raised about the impact of divided government. Fiscal
policy, for example, is driven by both Congress and the President, so the Fed may
care as much about who controls Congress as it cares about who controls the White
House. And if that is true, ought we not be as concerned about the Congressional
electoral calendar as the Presidential?
However, Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) present a model that views policy as a
weighted average of the preferences of the executive and legislative branches. Their
model predicts that “the policy outcome with a D[emocratic] president is always to
the left of the policy outcome with an R[epublican] president (p. 48).” Thus, while
divided government might have implications for the extent to which policy changes
when the party of the president changes, it is not expected to disturb the ordinal rank-
ing of policy outcomes. Therefore, it does not eliminate the intertemporal tradeoff
conservative central bankers face when bargaining with a right-wing incumbent.
Furthermore, the empirical record suggests that the primary determinant of congres-
sional elections is the party of the President (incumbent parties tend to lose seats) and
so, even if the Fed wanted to influence congressional elections, the state of the econ-
omy has a relatively small impact. The Fed’s problem would be even more compli-
cated under divided government. Suppose Congress is controlled by the Democrats
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but Republicans control the Presidency. A preelectoral expansion would help incum-
bents in both parties, but if the link between the economy and the presidential vote is
stronger than the link between the economy and congressional vote the Fed would
have good reasons to focus on the former.2
Another objection to our argument may be that if conservative Fed chairmen aid in
the election and reelection of Republican presidents, then we should not see Demo-
cratic presidents appointing inflation hawks. However, as we discussed above, our the-
oretical understanding of how central bank independence works relies on delegation
to a conservative central banker. Therefore, to ask why Democrats would appoint con-
servative central bankers is akin to asking why they choose to support central bank
independence. Although this question lies outside the scope of this article, it is useful
to note that Democrats, in particular, can pay a high cost when they fail to appoint
independent and hawkish central bankers.
Consider Carter’s decision to appoint G. William Miller who, because of his Keyne-
sian leanings, was thought to be more compatible with Carter’s approach to the econ-
omy than Nixon appointee Arthur Burns. Within months, the dollar’s value against
the Deutsche Mark and Yen was in free fall and Carter announced a shift to an anti-
inflation policy in November, 9 months into Miller’s term. In another 9 months
(before Miller’s first term was half over), Carter would appoint Paul Volcker, a well-
known inflation hawk, as the Fed Chairman. The former vicepresident of the New
York Fed adopted a tight monetary policy aimed at “wringing out inflationary expec-
tations” and restoring confidence in the dollar. Carter’s goal was, in the words of Vice
President Fritz Mondale, “to reassure financial markets”, and it appears to have
worked. Although Volcker’s aggressive stance against inflation probably contributed
to Carter’s defeat, it is by no means obvious that the President’s electoral fortunes
would have been better served had the crisis Volcker’s appointment was meant to curb
been allowed to continue. In other words, it is possible to imagine something worse
than tight monetary policy on the eve of an election.
Although it is true that this is just one anecdote, the reason we may not have more
observations is that, in practice, reappointing a Fed chairman who was appointed by
a predecessor from a different party appears to be almost automatic.3 Empirically, one
thing we can do is see if controlling for the party that appointed the Fed Chairman
influences our results. It does not (see appendix).
Finally, it is important to note that the results of our model would go through even
if Democrats had a tendency to appoint less hawkish Fed chairmen, as long as they
are not so dovish as to have ideal points closer to Democratic than Republican presi-
dents. Were this to happen, our predictions would continue to be borne out in the
subsample with Republican-appointed Chairmen, but not Democrat-appointed Chair-
men. In fact, however, our results are at least as strong under Democrat-appointed
Chairmen than Republican-appointed Chairmen (see appendix).
2. EVIDENCE: IS THE FED A CONDITIONAL INFLATION HAWK?
We explore the empirical evidence in support of the idea that the Fed is independent,
but not indifferent in a number of ways. First, we examine whether the party of the
2We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
3The only other exception was Reagan’s decision not to appoint Volcker a second time.
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incumbent president conditions the relationship between the Fed’s policy instrument
and the electoral cycle. We find that the Fed reduces the FFR as elections approach if
the sitting president is a Republican. This is not the case under Democrats. In fact,
there is some evidence that the FFR increases when elections draw near under Demo-
cratic presidents.
Then, we examine whether political factors condition the way the Fed responds to
inflation and the output gap. We consistently find that in the run up to elections: the
FFR (a) increases in response to inflation under Democrats but not under Republi-
cans; and (b) decreases in response to shortfalls in output under Republicans but not
under Democrats.
Finally, we show that the results just mentioned are robust with respect to numer-
ous research design decisions we have made and we explore the evidence relevant to a
competing perspective on the political sources of Fed behavior.
2.1 The Conditional Link between the Electoral Calendar and the Fed Funds Rate
The traditional political business cycle argument implies that if monetary policy is
under the sway of politicians, interest rates ought to be lowered as elections draw near
(solid lines in Panel (a) of Figure 2). Existing attempts to add central bank indepen-
dence to this picture suggest that independence ought to dampen this effect – there
should be little or no link between interest rates and the electoral calendar (dashed
lines in Panel (a) of Figure 2). The traditional partisan model of monetary policy pre-
dicts that interest rates ought to be higher when right-wing governments are in power
than when left-wing government are in power (solid lines in Panel (b) of Figure 2). If
the central bank is a neutral inflation hawk, then partisan differences in interests ought
to remain, though at a lower rate reflecting the unconditional influence of an indepen-
dent central bank (dashed lines in Panel (b) of Figure 2). Our model, however, pre-
dicts a relationship between the electoral calendar and interest rates under central
bank independence that is distinct from both of these alternatives. If the central bank
supports the electoral and reelectoral efforts of right-wing parties, interest rates ought
to decrease (increase) as elections draw near under right-wing (left-wing) governments
(dashed lines in Panel (c) of Figure 2). In contrast, in the absence of central bank
independence, our model predicts the same behavior as the traditional PBC model
does (solid lines in Panel (c) Figure 2). In this section, we use data on the Federal
Funds Rate to evaluate this claim.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. Hypothesized link between interest rates and the electoral calendar.
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Figure 3 traces the evolution of the FFR since Eisenhower’s first term in office.4
The difference between the Democrat and the Republican periods is striking. For
every Democratic term in office, the interest rate path ends at a higher level than it
started. For every Republican president’s term, it ends at a lower rate than it started.
The Federal funds rate climbs during each Democratic administration and falls, often
precipitously, before Republican incumbents come up for reelection.
Although the data in Figure 3 are visually compelling, one objection may be that
the Fed is behaving differently under Democrats and Republicans because underlying
macroeconomic conditions differ when partisan control varies. To ensure that the pat-
tern identified above is not driven by differences in the underlying economic condi-
tions to which the Fed is responding, it is important to control for these underlying
conditions. To that end, we estimate models of the following form:
FFRt ¼ bEElectionþ bDDemocrat þ bEDElection Democrat
þ bYYGapþ bpInflationþ bFFFRt1 þ XPþ 
ð2Þ
FFR is the effective federal funds rate. Election is an election counter which equals 0
in the period that immediately follows a presidential election. Election is then incre-
mented by one in every subsequent quarter until it reaches 15. Democrat is a dummy
variable equal to one when a Democratic president is in office and 0 otherwise. YGap
is the output gap, defined as the percentage deviation of the real GDP from real
potential GDP.5 We use the annualized quarterly change in the Consumer Price Index
(for all urban consumers) as our measure of inflation. P is a vector of dummy vari-















Figure 3. Federal funds rate over time. Vertical bars correspond to presidential elections. The red
shading indicates periods of Republican rule in the White House.
4Data on the FFR were obtained from the FRED database, published by the St. Louis Fed.
5Real potential GDP represents real GDP under conditions of full employment. Estimates are from the
Congressional Budget Office.
6Including dummy variables for each presidential administration allows for structural breaks in the mone-
tary regime, that is, it allows us to relax the assumption that the Fed’s target interest rate, conditional on
inflation and output gap, remained constant throughout the 1951–2008 period. A side effect of this modeling
choice is that the value of the Democrat coefficient will be sensitive to which presidential dummy is omitted,
but this is of no substantive significance because D does not enter in the marginal effects that interest us.
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macroeconomic data are from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. All variables are measured at quarterly intervals. Our tests cover the period
from July 1954 (the earliest point when the Fed Funds Rate is available) to October
2008 (the end of the last complete electoral period).
If our argument is correct, the coefficient on the election variable, which captures
the estimated effect of a movement toward an election when Democrat = 0, ought to
be negative and statistically significant. The coefficient on the interaction term should
also be positive and large compared with the coefficient on election. Table 1 shows
that this is the case in Model 1. The coefficient on Election is negative and statistically
significant and the coefficient on the interaction is positive and roughly twice as large
as the coefficient on Election. This model essentially summarizes the plot in Figure 3:
on average interest rates drop over the course of Republican administrations, but
increase over the course of Democratic administrations.
Figure 4 graphically displays the estimated marginal effect of a change in electoral
quarter in Democratic and Republican administrations based on Model 1. Note that
the confidence interval around the estimated effect under Republican administrations
is negative, but the confidence interval around the estimated effect under a Democratic
administration is positive. Thus, according to Model 1, interest rates go down as elec-
tions draw near when Republicans control the White House, but they go up when
elections draw near when Democrats control the White House. The magnitude of the
changes involved are also substantively significant. For example, Model 1 suggests
that the Fed Funds Rate is expected to go down by about six basis points each
quarter as elections approach when the Republicans control the White House and up
by about the same amount under Democrats. To put these estimated changes in
TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTION CYCLES AND THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE (FFR), CONDITIONAL
ON THE PARTY OF THE INCUMBENT PRESIDENT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Election 0:062 0:062 0:035 0:039
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Democrat 0.748y 0.936 0.633 0.577y
(0.380) (0.366) (0.312) (0.323)
Election 9 democrat 0.120 0.112 0.068 0.070
(0.039) (0.038) (0.046) (0.046)






FFRt1 0.796 0.704 0.727 0.749
(0.063) (0.066) (0.058) (0.063)
N 217 217 217 217
R2 0.983 0.985 0.987 0.987
Adj. R2 0.982 0.983 0.986 0.986
Resid. sd 0.884 0.844 0.781 0.780
Ordinary least squares regression with FFR as dependent variable. Administration dummies omitted.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
yp\ :10; p\ :05; p\ :01; p\ :001.
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perspective it is useful to remember that the median quarterly change in the Fed
Funds Rate during this period is two basis points.
It is possible, however, that this observed difference in Fed behavior under Demo-
cratic and Republican presidents could be explained by differences in macroeconomic
conditions associated with Democratic or Republican rule. Thus, in Models 2 and 3, we
control for macroeconomic conditions by including the two Taylor-rule variables: out-
put gap and inflation. Evidence that the Fed acts differently under Republican and
Democratic presidents is generally robust to the inclusion of a control for inflation
(Model 2), and inflation and the output gap (Model 3) – although the interaction term
is no longer statistically significant in the latter case. Figure 4 shows that the marginal
effect of elections on the FFR when Republicans control the White House is negative in
models 2 and 3. In contrast, the marginal effect of elections is either positive (Model 2)
or indistinguishable from zero (Model 3) when Democrats control the White House.
Some might argue that a politically disinterested Fed behaves in systematically dif-
ferent ways under Democratic and Republican presidents because it is responding to
partisan differences in fiscal policy. For example, if one believed that Democrats were
prone to larger deficits, a Fed that is an inflation hawk might need to engage in mone-
tary contractions to counter this loose fiscal policy. Although we believe there is little
evidence that Democrats produce larger budget deficits, we control for Surplus/GDP
to rule out this alternative explanation.7 Both Table 1 and Figure 4 show that the
results change little with the addition of this control. As was the case for Model 3, the
estimated marginal effect of an increase in electoral proximity is negative and statisti-
cally significant when the Republicans control the White, but positive, albeit not sig-
nificantly so, when Democrats control the White House.
2.2 The Fed’s Conditional Reaction Function
The previous section implicitly assumes that interest rates are driven primarily by the
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Figure 4. Marginal effect associated with moving one quarter closer to an election under Republican
and Democratic Presidents. Lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
7Data on the federal government surplus are only available at yearly intervals, but our other variables are
measured quarterly. We used cubic spline interpolation to create a quarterly Surplus/GDP measure. In
another specification, omitted here for brevity, we used a quarterly measure of federal government expendi-
tures in lieu of the surplus variable. The results were substantively unchanged.
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our argument. More plausibly, perhaps, the Fed’s reaction function may be fundamen-
tally similar to the Taylor rule, but strategic considerations may cause the Fed to devi-
ate from the textbook policies we would associate with a politically disinterested
central bank. If the Fed were operating according to the Taylor rule, it would raise
interest rates in response to increased inflation and lower interest rates in response to a
decrease in the output gap. Empirically, we might capture such behavior with a model
such as:
FFRt ¼ aYYGapþ apInflationþ aFFFRt1 þ ; ð3Þ
with the expectation that aY [ 0; ap [ 0. If the Fed behaves as an inflation hawk,
the coefficient on the output gap would be close to zero and the coefficient on inflation
would be large. If the Fed is more concerned about shortfalls in output than inflation,
the converse would be true – the coefficient on the output gap would be large and the
coefficient on inflation would be close to zero. The traditional PBC model would pre-
dict that a dependent central bank would act less and less like an inflation hawk as
elections draw near. Thus, aY and ap are conditional on the electoral calendar. In
addition, our argument suggests that the conditioning effect of the electoral calendar
is different when Republicans control the White House than when Democrats do. The
appropriate conditional model, therefore, is:
FFRt ¼bpInflation þ bpEInflation  Election þ bpDInflation  Democrat
þ bpEDInflation Election  Democrat
þ bYYGapþ bYEYGap Election þ bYDYGap Democrat
þ bYDEYGap  Democrat  Election
þ bEElection þ bDDemocrat þ bDEDemocrat  Election
þ bFFFRt1 þ XPþ 
;
ð4Þ
and the conditional effects of changes in inflation are given by:
@FFR
@Inflation
¼ bp þ bpEElectionþ bpDDemocratþ bpEDElection  Democrat;
ð5Þ
when Republicans are in office (D = 0) this simplifies to
@FFR
@InflationjDemocrat ¼ 0 ¼ bp þ bpEElection; ð6Þ
which is a straight line that summarizes how electoral proximity influences the rela-
tionship between inflation and interest rates when Republicans control the White
House. If our argument is correct, the Fed ought to respond to increased inflation less
aggressively as Republican incumbents draw closer to reelection. Thus, the slope
parameter (bpE) ought to be negative, or at least not positive. The model in the first
column in Table 2 suggests this is the case – the interaction term Election 9 p is nega-
tive and statistically significant. Note also that the coefficient on p is positive and
statistically significant. This suggests that a1 of the Taylor rule (1) is positive – as we
would expect if the Fed is an inflation hawk – in the period furthest away from the
next election (i.e., when Election =0).
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When Democrats control the White House five simplifies to:
@FFR
@InflationjDemocrat ¼ 1 ¼ ½bp þ bpD þ ½bpE þ bpEDElection: ð7Þ
If out argument is correct, the Fed should respond to increased inflation more
aggressively as elections draws near. Thus, the slope parameter (bpE þ bpED) ought to
be positive. It is easy to see that in Table 2 the sum of the coefficients p 9 Elec-
tion + p 9 Democrat 9 Election = 0.052. A Wald test reveals that this slope is statisti-
cally distinguishable from zero at the 0.10 confidence level.
The conditional relationship between the Fed Funds Rate and inflation can be more
clearly seen graphically. The top left-hand panel in Figure 5 plots equations 3 (in red)
and 4 (in blue) across the 16 quarters of a presidential administration.
The positive slope on the blue line suggest that when a Democrat is in office the
Fed acts more like an inflation hawk as elections draw near. Specifically, in these cir-
TABLE 2. FED REACTION TO CHANGES IN OUTPUT GAP AND INFLATION, CONDITIONAL ON ELECTORAL CYCLES
AND PARTY OF THE PRESIDENT
p pt  pet4 pe
p 0.217 0.144 0.417
(0.074) (0.119) (0.165)
p 9 election 0:016 0.011 0:028y
(0.006) (0.017) (0.015)
p 9 democrat 0.594 0:528 0.631
(0.393) (0.205) (0.413)
p 9 election 9 democrat 0.068 0.080 0.083
(0.031) (0.028) (0.031)
Y-gap 0.069 0.001 0.080
(0.119) (0.149) (0.124)
Y-gap 9 election 0.027y 0.037 0.024y
(0.015) (0.018) (0.013)
Y-gap 9 democrat 0.267 0.165 0.172
(0.172) (0.164) (0.154)
Y-gap 9 election 9 democrat 0.028 0:059y 0.024
(0.021) (0.032) (0.020)
Election 0.009 0:075 0.052
(0.021) (0.030) (0.063)
Democrat 2.476 1.135 2.775y
(0.998) (0.417) (1.462)
Election 9 democrat 0:128 0.203 0:229
(0.062) (0.092) (0.086)
Surplus/GDP 0.014 0.018 0.054
(0.059) (0.069) (0.067)
FFRt1 0.573 0.612 0.525
(0.108) (0.108) (0.125)
N 217 192 196
R2 0.990 0.989 0.990
Adj. R2 0.988 0.988 0.989
Resid. sd 0.702 0.766 40.732
Ordinary least squares regression with FFR as dependent variable. Administration dummies omitted.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
yp\ :10; p\ :05; p\ :01; p\ :001.
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cumstances the Fed places a greater weight on hitting its inflation target. In contrast,
the negative slope on the red line suggest that the association between interest rates
and inflation goes to zero as Republican incumbents near reelection. By comparing
equations 6 and 7, we can see that the difference in the slope of these two lines is cap-
tured by the value of the p 9 Democrat 9 Election coefficient in Table 2. Note that
this is consistently positive and statistically significant. This suggests that Election
affects the relationship between inflation and the Fed Funds Rate differently when
Democrats and Republicans control the White House. Furthermore, we can see that
the estimated marginal effect of a change in inflation is positive when Republicans
control the White House and elections are far off (Election < 9) and when Democrats
control the White House and elections draw near (Election > 12). It is worth noting
that the canonical Taylor rule coefficients on the inflation and output gaps are both
0.5, which suggests that the magnitude of our estimates are not unreasonable. What is
interesting is that the Fed tends to pursue one of these goals at at time, not both. And
which one they pursue depends on the party of the President.
Our model also makes conditional statements about the relationship between inter-
est rates and the output gap. Based on equation 4, the conditional effect of a change
in the output gap is given by
@FFR
@YGap































Figure 5. Marginal effect of inflation and output gap on the federal funds rate, conditional on the
election calendar under Republican (red) and Democratic (blue) presidents. Solid lines indicate
statistical significance at the a = 0.05 level.
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when Republicans are in office (D = 0) this simplifies to
@FFR
@YGapjDemocrat ¼ 0 ¼ bY þ bYEElection; ð9Þ
which is the equation for the red line in the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 2. Note
that the slope of this line is the coefficient on the interaction between the output gap
and electoral proximity which is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in
column one of Table 2. This suggests that as elections draw near the Fed places
greater emphasis on hitting its output target. In fact, the bottom left-hand panel of
Figure 5 shows that, with the exception of the four quarter period after an election,
there is a statistically distinguishable association between the Fed Funds Rate and the
output gap when the Republicans control the White House. In contrast, the postelec-
tion honeymoon period is the only time when such a relationship exists when the
Democrats are in the White house.
An examination of the results in the first column of Table 2 and the left-hand panel
of Figure 5, therefore, supports the notion that the Fed is a conditional inflation
hawk. When the Democrats control the White House, the Fed appears to pay
increased attention to hitting its inflation target and a decreased emphasis on its out-
put target as elections draw near. When Republicans are in office the Fed shifts its
attention in the opposite direction.
The evidence shown above is consistent with our argument that the Fed is not polit-
ically indifferent but not consistent with any other story we can think of. Below, we
will compare these results to the expectations of competing theories about the link
between monetary policy and electoral politics. However, before doing so, it is impor-
tant to consider whether our central results are robust.
2.3 Robustness Checks
Although we think the above results are important and provocative, we need to estab-
lish whether they are driven by research design choices. Specifically, we examine
whether the results depend on a) the nature of the Fed’s reaction function with respect
to inflation; b) influential observations; c) the timing of Fed policy; d) unmodeled het-
erogeneity deriving from unique characteristics of individual Fed chairmen; e) deci-
sions about how to measure inflationary expectations; or f) decisions about how to
model time dynamics.
Inflation, Inflation Surprise, Inflation Expectations Up to this point, our discussion
has assumed that the underlying model the Fed uses to set policy is one in which the
Fed responds to current changes in the economy in a fashion similar to the Taylor
rule – specifically, the Fed alters interest rates in response to the current inflation rate
and the current output gap. However, a more standard treatment (Barro and Gordon,
1983) would hold that the Fed is trying to minimize a loss function similar to the one
we introduced to explain voter preferences (equation 1). In this loss function, the Fed
would be responding to the size of the output gap and the size of the inflationary sur-
prise – that is the gap between realized inflation and the amount of inflation that had
been forecast. If realized inflation exceeded expected inflation, an inflation hawk
would be particularly eager to raise interest rates. To capture this possibility, column
2 of Table 2 uses the gap between the current inflation rate and the Fed’s forecast for
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the current quarter from the previous year. An examination of the central panel of
Figure 5 shows that the relationship between the size of the inflationary surprise and
the Fed Funds Rate is very similar to the relationship between inflation and the Fed
Funds Rate – the Fed places great weight on hitting its inflation target when elections
approach if and only if the Democrats control the White House. The red line in the
lower center panel shows that when Republicans control the White House the Fed
becomes more responsive to changes in the output gap as election draw near, but the
blue line shows that when Democrats control the White House the Fed’s response to
changes in the output gap is statistically distinguishable from zero only in the postelec-
tion honeymoon period. Thus, using this more refined definition of the inflation target
has an effect on the relationship between the Fed Funds Rate and the output gap pro-
duces results that are qualitatively similar to the results previously presented.
Next, it is worth considering the possibility that the Fed is a politically indifferent
inflation hawk, but that it holds different expectations about future inflation under
Republicans and Democrats. Specifically, if a politically indifferent Fed expects Demo-
crats to adopt more inflationary policies in the run-up to elections, it may have incen-
tives to raise interest rates. We examine this possibility in column 3 of Table 2, where
we substitute a measure of inflationary expectations for the inflation variable used in
column 1. We find that our results change very little – the patterns in the right-hand-
side panel of Figure 5 are essentially the same as in the left-handside panel. That is,
whether one believes the Fed is responding to the current inflation rate or to surprise
inflation, the Fed behaves as a conditional inflation hawk.
The Volcker Effect? It is well known that Chairman Paul Volcker played an impor-
tant role in “wringing out inflationary expectations” during the later part of the Carter
and the early part of the first Reagan administration. This pronounced monetary con-
traction in the period just before a Democrat stood for reelection and just after a
Republican came to power fits our argument so well that it may be driving our results.
To examine this possibility, Table 3 replicates the models from Table 2 using a sample
that drops the observations when Volcker was chairman. Notice that the coefficients
in this table are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2. Figure 6 shows that the key
elements of our central results are robust to the exclusion of the Volcker years: inter-
est rates are linked to inflation as Democrats approach reelection, but not when
Republicans control the White House, and interest rates are increasingly linked to the
output gap as Republicans near the end of their term, but not when Democrats do.
That said, it should be pointed out that the magnitude of the effects are smaller when
the Volcker years are removed from the sample – especially when it comes to the link
between Fed policy and inflation (note the difference in scale on the y-axis in the top
panels of Figures 5 and 6).
The notion that our results may be driven by peculiarities related to Volcker’s ten-
ure as chairman raises the question of whether there are aspects of other chairs’ ten-
ures that introduce unmodeled heterogeneity. To control for this possibility we
reestimated all our models with Chairman dummies and our results were substantially
unchanged (see web appendix).
Timing of Monetary Policy If the effect of monetary policy on growth is not instanta-
neous, manipulating the FFR just before an election is unlikely to affect the economy
in time to influence voters. Similarly, Bernanke’s announcement of a third round of
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quantitative easing in September 2012 may seem pro-Democrat, but the real effects of
this policy are unlikely to take place until after the election.
If anecdotes like this are part of a pattern, then tests of our theory that are based
on full electoral cycles will understate the strength of association between electoral
cycles, the party of the President, and the FFR. Indeed, when we replicate the models
shown above but exclude the last quarter or the last two quarters of each election
cycle, our results are strengthened (see web appendix).
Measuring Inflationary Expectations There is also the possibility that our central
results depend on the way inflationary expectations are measured. We reestimated the
inflation surprise model in the second column of Table 2 with three alternative mea-
sures of inflationary expectations: Households is the median expected price change
(12 months) obtained from a household survey conducted by the Survey Research
Center at the University of Michigan; Forecasters is the median 1 year inflation
TABLE 3. FED REACTION TO CHANGES IN OUTPUT GAP AND INFLATION, CONDITIONAL ON ELECTORAL CYCLES
AND PARTY OF THE PRESIDENT. VOLCKER CHAIRMANSHIP OMITTED
p pt  pet4 pe
p 0.137y 0.109 0.318
(0.080) (0.089) (0.202)
p 9 election 0.008 0.007 0.016
(0.007) (0.010) (0.020)
p 9 democrat 0:301 0:303 0:475
(0.111) (0.135) (0.216)
p 9 election 9 democrat 0.034 0.045 0.047
(0.010) (0.016) (0.021)
Y-gap 0.184y 0.129 0.164
(0.102) (0.133) (0.124)
Y-gap 9 election 0.013 0.019 0.014
(0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Y-gap 9 democrat 0.051 0.068 0.038
(0.110) (0.139) (0.130)
Y-gap 9 election 9 democrat 0.020 0.027 0.019
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013)
Election 0.005 0:054 0.013
(0.027) (0.022) (0.084)
Democrat 1.643 1.023 2.058
(0.417) (0.381) (0.490)
Election 9 democrat 0.038 0.110 0.092
(0.032) (0.036) (0.086)
Surplus/GDP 0.064 0.058 0.056
(0.070) (0.083) (0.088)
FFRt1 0.697 0.701 0.655
(0.086) (0.093) (0.112)
N 185 160 164
R2 0.991 0.991 0.991
Adj. R2 0.989 0.989 0.990
Resid. sd 0.559 0.587 0.569
Ordinary least squares regression with FFR as dependent variable. Administration dummies omitted.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
yp\ :10; p\ :05; p\ :01; p\ :001.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
INDEPENDENT BUT NOT INDIFFERENT 17
expectation from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Philadelphia Fed); and
Cleveland Fed is a model-based measure of inflationary expectations computed for the
1-year horizon by the Cleveland Fed. A graphical representation of the results is dis-
played in Figure 7 (see web appendix for a table of results). Notice that in general
the results change little. The output gap appears to drive policy when Republicans
are in the White House and facing reelection, and inflation drives policy when the
Democrats are in the White House and facing reelection or Republicans are in the
White House and enjoying a postelection honeymoon. The biggest change in results
is a general decline in statistical significance, which can probably be attributed to a
decline in sample size due to the unavailability of the alternative measures for early
time periods.
Dynamics Breusch-Godfrey tests show that there remains residual autocorrelation in
most of the models shown above. This suggests that including a single lagged depen-
dent variable may be inadequate to capture the time dynamics correctly. To address
this issue, we reestimated all models with three alternative specifications. The first
includes additional lagged dependent variables, the second includes an AR(1) term,
and the third includes autoregressive and moving average terms with order determined
by the algorithm of Hyndman and Khandakar (2008). Our substantive conclusions



































Figure 6. Marginal effect of inflation and output gap on the federal funds rate, conditional on the
election calendar under Republican (red) and Democratic (blue) presidents omitting the
Chairmanship of Paul Volcker. Solid lines indicate statistical significance at the a = 0.05 level.
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2.4 Alternative Explanations
We now consider two approaches to the way the party of the president might influ-
ence monetary policy. First, we address the possibility that our result might be
explained by the “rational partisan cycle” developed by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).
We argue that our argument is broadly consistent with Alesina and Rosenthal’s find-
ing that Democrats (Republicans) preside over macroeconomic expansions (contrac-
tions) after coming to office. However, the rational partisan model cannot account for
the patterns in interest rates we have described above. We then consider the argument
that the Fed responds not to the party of the sitting president, but the party of the
president that first appointed the sitting chairman of the Fed. We find no evidence to
support the idea that monetary policy is driven by the party of the president that first
appointed the sitting Fed chairman.
The Rational Partisan Cycle Alesina and Rosenthal posit that there should be parti-
san differences in policy and outcomes due to uncertainty about who will be elected
president. Democrats are known to favor growth over price stability and Republicans
vice versa. Consequently, in the period before elections, asset holders write wage con-
tracts that account for partisan differences in expected inflation and the possibility
that there may be a change in government. For example, if expected inflation under
Democrats is four and under Republicans it is two and both parties are equally likely
to win the election, then expected inflation written into wage contracts in the period
just before the election is three. If a Democrat (Republican) is elected, then realized
inflation will exceed expected inflation and there will be a burst (decline) in output
bringing it above its natural rate. In contrast, wage contracts written after the election






























Figure 7. Marginal effect of an inflationary surprise and output gap on the federal funds rate,
conditional on the election calendar under Republican (red) and Democratic (blue) presidents using
alternative measures of inflationary expectations. Solid lines indicate statistical significance at the
a = 0.05 level.
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will reflect the knowledge of which party was elected and, so, inflation will equal
expected inflation in the later part of administrations of both parties. Economic
expansions (contractions) are expected early in Democratic (Republican) terms, but
growth rates should converge to the natural rate in the later part of both Democratic
and Republican presidencies.
Alesina and Rosenthal find evidence for their argument in the fact that “[E]very
Republican administration since the Second World War, until the second Reagan
administration, had a recession that began within the first year of the term. On the
contrary, none of the Democratic administrations had a recession or even a down-
turn in their first halves.” (p. 180) They point out that these findings are in tension
with the expectations of the traditional business cycle “which predicts that every
administration...should begin with a recession and end with above-average growth.”
(p. 180). However, it is consistent with our claim that the Fed adopts an accommo-
dative posture toward politicians who are trying to manipulate the economy for elec-
toral purposes if and only if the White House is controlled by a Republican. Thus,
the partisan nature of fluctuations in output are consistent with both the Rational
Partisan model and our model. However, our model yields predictions that are dis-
tinct from the Rational Partisan model with respect to the manipulation of monetary
policy.
If economic contractions occur early in Republican terms because Republican poli-
cies under shoot inflationary expectations caused by the possibility of a Democratic
being elected, we would expect a technocratic Fed to lower interest rates early in
Republican administrations and raise them as inflationary expectations are reflected
in postelection wage contracts. Similarly, if economic expansions occur early in Dem-
ocratic terms because Democratic policies exceed the inflationary expectations caused
by the possibility of a Republican being elected, we would expect a technocratic Fed
to raise interest rates early in Democratic terms and adjust them downward as infla-
tionary expectations adjust. The findings we presented above suggest exactly the
opposite occurs: The Fed raises (lower) interest rates early in Republican (Demo-
cratic) administrations and lower (raises) them over the next 4 years as elections
approach.
The Party of the Appointing President We have argued that the Federal Reserve has
preferences that lead it to act differently under Republican than Democratic presi-
dents. Further, we have argued that this difference in behavior is aimed at electing
and reelecting Republican presidents and that this occurs because of, not in spite of,
the Fed’s political independence. An alternative hypothesis is that the Fed is actually
not all that independent – rather, the Fed may act in ways that benefit the party that
first appointed its chairman (Abrams and Iossifov, 2006). Table 4 can be used to eval-
uate this hypothesis. In Table 4, we replicate the models from Table 1 but replace the
party of the president variable with a dummy variable that equals one when the Fed
chairman was initially appointed by a president of the same party as the incumbent
president. If a match between the party of the president and the party that appointed
the Fed Chairmen is what generates electoral monetary cycles, we would expect the
coefficient on the election variable to be indistinguishable from zero, and the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term to be negative and large.
The former is true, but the latter is not – the coefficient on the interaction term is
not statistically distinguishable from zero and becomes positive once we control for
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fiscal policy. This result does not eliminate the possible existence of a preelectoral
monetary expansion when the party of the incumbent president matches the party of
the president that initially appointed the sitting Fed Chairman. To see if this is the
case we need to sum the coefficient on the electoral variable with the coefficient on the
interaction term. Figure 8 is a graphical depiction of the estimated effect of a one
quarter increase in electoral proximity both when the party of the incumbent president
TABLE 4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEENELECTIONCYCLES AND THEFEDERALFUNDSRATE (FFR),CONDITIONAL ON THE
MATCH BETWEEN THEPARTYWHICHAPPOINTED THEFEDCHAIRMANAND THEPARTY OF THE SITTINGPRESIDENT.
ORDINARYLEAST SQUARESREGRESSIONWITHFFRASDEPENDENTVARIABLE. PRESIDENTIALDUMMIESOMITTED
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Election 0.004 0.001 0.019 0.016
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Chairman party 0.435 0.346 0.037 0.124
(0.362) (0.334) (0.282) (0.316)
Election 9 chairman party 0.023 0.029 0.018 0.008
(0.031) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029)






FFRt1 0.873 0.773 0.772 0.790
(0.058) (0.062) (0.054) (0.059)
N 217 217 217 217
R2 0.930 0.936 0.948 0.948
Adj. R2 0.924 0.931 0.943 0.943
Resid. sd 0.912 0.871 0.792 0.792
Ordinary least squares regression with FFR as dependent variable. Administration dummies omitted.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 8. Marginal effect associated with moving one quarter closer when party of incumbent
president matches or does not match party of president that appointed chairman. Lines indicate 90%
confidence intervals.
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does and does not match the party of the president that initially appointed the sitting
Fed chairman. Note that while the estimated effect is always negative, it is never
statistically significant. In summary, we find no support for the idea that the Fed
accommodates electoral pressures if the incumbent president is from the same party as
the president that initially appointed the Fed chairman.
It should be noted that these results are in conflict with those in Abrams and I-
ossifov (2006). The model we use to test their argument differs from theirs in a
number of ways. We use a linear counter variable to capture electoral proximity
rather than a dummy variable that equals one in the seven quarters before an elec-
tion. They use a term that is the product of a dummy variable which equals one
when there is a match between the party of the incumbent president and the party
of the president that initially appointed the sitting Fed Chairman, but not the con-
stitutive terms of this interaction. We believe a model that includes the constitutive
terms is a better model because it allows one to compare electoral periods where
there is a match with electoral periods where there is not a match. The model that
does not include constitutive terms assumes what the authors say they want to test
– that is, that interest rate policy is the same during nonelectoral periods as it is
during electoral periods without a match. In addition, our model does not include
an AR(1) term. Finally, our test includes a longer time period (July 1954 to Octo-
ber 2008 as opposed to 1957–2004). The null result we present here, however,
stands up to the relaxation of all of these decisions (we refer interested readers to
the online appendix).
2.5 Summary
We presented results from a set of simple ordinary least squares regressions using data
on more than five decades of Fed activity. We find that the Fed:
1. Increases interest rates before elections when Democrats are in office.
2. Lowers interest rates when Republicans are vying for reelection.
3. Reacts to inflationary pressures when Democrats are in office, especially when
elections are near.
4. Does not react to inflationary pressures when Republicans are facing reelection.
5. Is insensitive to the output gap when Democratic presidents are standing for
reelection.
6. Is more sensitive to the difference between realized and potential GDP at the end
of a Republican’s term.
Unlike competing models, our argument predicts all of these results. What distin-
guishes our argument from alternative models is the idea that the Fed is cognizant of
the intertemporal tradeoff it faces when Republicans control the White House. Models
that do not account for this intertemporal tradeoff produce predictions in conflict with
our findings.
To see why, recall that extant explanations of the politics of macroeconomic policy
vary based on the assumptions they make about effectiveness of central bank indepen-
dence and whether elected officials are partisan or electoralist.
For example, if the Fed were independent and indifferent and both parties were
opportunistic vote maximizers, we would find evidence of the Fed counteracting
electoralist behavior of incumbents from both parties. Thus, we would expect to
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observe findings (1), (3), and (5) but not (2), (4), and (6). If, on the contrary, the Fed
was simply bending to the will of opportunistic leaders in both parties, we would
expect to observe (2), (4), and (6), but not (1), (3), and (5).
Alternatively, if the Fed were independent and indifferent in a world where the parti-
san model operated, we would not see a connection between the Fed’s reaction function
and the electoral calendar. Thus, we would have no reason to expect to observe either
(2), (4), or (6). If this last world pertained and the Fed knew something about the infla-
tionary tendencies of the Democrats compared with the Republicans that was not cap-
tured in the measures of expected inflation, then we might observe tighter monetary
policies under the Democrats, but this would not be tied to the electoral calendar. Thus,
we again might observe (1), (3), and (5) but not (2), (4), and (6) – and certainly not (4)
and (6) together. That is, it is possible that the Fed charges Democrats an interest rate
premium because it believes measures of expected inflation do not fully capture the pol-
icy differences between the parties. If this were true the Fed would always react to
changes in both inflation and the output gap but the magnitude (but not significance)
of the coefficients would depend on the party that controls the White House. In other
words, the lines in the marginal effects graphs would not cross, and the red lines captur-
ing the reaction function for Republicans would be parallel to the x-axis.
If the parties acted according to the partisan logic and the Fed were dependent,
none of our six findings should be true. In this world, we would expect the Fed to
reduce interest rates before elections under Democrats, but not under Republicans,
because the latter hold strong antiinflationary preferences. Likewise, we would expect
the Fed to react to the output gap before elections under Democrats, but not under
Republicans.
3. CONCLUSION: DOES THE FED TIP THE SCALE?
The Fed has macroeconomic policy preferences that are closer to the median of the
Republican party than to the median of the Democratic party. A partially independent
central bank will, all else equal, set policies that are a weighted average of the party in
power and its own preferences. Consequently, in normal times, the Fed expects it to
be easier to accomplish its policy goals when Republicans control the White House
than when Democrats do. As voters reward preelectoral expansions in output, strate-
gic central bankers face an intertemporal tradeoff when Republicans are in power. Do
they stick to their antiinflationary “guns” or do they compromise in the short-run to
increase the probability that policy goals in the future will be easier to accomplish?
When Democrats are in the White House the Fed faces no such tradeoff. Acting as a
good inflation hawk now has the added benefit of increasing the likelihood that they
will have a party in power in the future that requires less accommodation.
The choice confronting partially independent strategic central bankers when faced
with a Republican incumbent is simple: compromise now, or compromise later. Our
results suggest that since achieving operational independence in the middle of the last
century, the Fed has consistently chosen the former. The behavior we have observed
is consistent with the possibility that the Fed seeks to aid the election and reelection
of Republican presidents.
We have not examined whether the Fed’s politically motivated changes in interest
rates has had the intended effects on macroeconomic aggregates in part because the
link between interest rates and growth is a long standing question in macroeconomics
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that we do not believe we can adjudicate here. We also have not examined whether
the difference in the Fed’s reaction function under Democrats and Republicans has
had an electoral impact. However, a glimpse at the last century of American history is
suggestive. In the half century since the “Treasury-Fed Accord” gave to the Fed oper-
ational independence by removing its obligation to monetize the Treasury’s debt at a
fixed rate, the White House has been occupied by a Republican for almost two-thirds
of the time. Every Republican president to run for reelection since the Fed became
operationally independent – with the exception of George Herbert Walker Bush – was
reelected. In contrast, Clinton was the only Democratic president to serve two full
terms after the Fed became independent.8; Democrats held the presidency slightly
more than half of the portion of the twentieth century that preceded the Treasury-Fed
Accord. Although not a single Republican president was reelected in the first half of
the twentieth century (though Republican presidents frequently succeed each other),
both Democratic presidents in the first half of the twentieth century were re-elected:
Wilson once, and Roosevelt three times.
Our findings also have implications for the broader literature on comparative political
economy in industrial democracies – particularly as they relate to the partisan model of
macroeconomic policy that launched the field of Comparative Political Economy more
than three decades ago (Cameron, 1978; Hibbs, 1977; Tufte, 1978). While intuitive,
there is little evidence to support the partisan model and what little evidence can be
found for partisan difference in broad measures of monetary and fiscal policy or out-
comes is as likely as not to support a counterintuitive “Nixon in China” type of rela-
tionship where left-wing parties preside over higher interest rates and smaller deficits
than left-wing governments. Casual empiricists have been unable to avoid the glaring
presence of record deficits during the Reagan and Bush presidencies. And one recent
study (Broz, Forthcoming) finds that right-wing governments are associated with the
“twin deficits” thought to be a harbinger of financial crises Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
What explains the dearth of evidence of traditional partisan cycles? What might
explain the occasional finding that right-wing governments are more profligate than
left? The evidence presented in this article suggests the answer lies in two places. First,
we believe that while there may be partisan differences in underlying preferences, the
vagaries of democratic political competition induce in leaders of all stripes to act in
similar fashion. And that fashion is to respond to the tendency of voters to assess eco-
nomic performance in the recent past when deciding whether or not to support the
incumbent. This induces all incumbents to act as if they prefer macroeconomic expan-
sions in preelectoral periods (and, perhaps, macroeconomic contractions in postelec-
toral periods). Second, we argue that independent central banks run by conservative
central bankers are likely to be more eager to thwart the electorally motivated expan-
sions by left-wing governments than right-wing governments. Consequently, the lack of
widespread support for the traditional partisan hypothesis is the result of the fact that
all parties would like to act like right-wing governments after elections and left-wing
governments before elections. In the absence of central bank independence, there is
nothing to stop governments of all ideological stripes from doing so, and so, we
observe no difference between the parties. In the presence of central bank indepen-
dence, left-wing governments are constrained and/or deterred from attempting to cre-
8While Johnson was also elected to a second term in 1964 while an incumbent, he had assumed office after
Kennedy’s assassination in 1963. In March, 1968, he announced that he would not seek reelection.”
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ate preelectoral macroeconomic expansions, but right-wing governments are not. And
so, under these conditions, we observe the counterintuitive partisan difference that
right-wing governments preside over more lax fiscal and monetary policies than left-
wing governments. This would also help explain why Broz finds a link between right-
wing governments and both fiscal and current account deficits and the financial crises
they portend.
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